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Abstract
George Bealer provides an account of intuitions as “intellectual seem-
ings.” My purpose in this paper is to criticize the phenomenological consid-
erations that Bealer offers in favor of his account. In the first part I review 
Bealer’s attempt to distinguish intuitions from beliefs, judgments, guesses, 
and hunches. I examine each of the three phenomenological differences – in-
corrigibility, implasticity, and scope – that Bealer adduces between intuitions 
and these other types of mental contents. I argue that any difference between 
intuitions and these other types of mental contents with regards to their 
incorrigibility, implasticity, and scope is unproven and likely to remain un-
proven. In the second part I criticize Bealer’s analogy between intuitions and 
sensory seemings by suggesting that intuitions do not display the theoretical 
virtues—consistency, corroboration, and confirmation—that Bealer claims 
for them. Moreover, I suggest that intuitions do not display the theoretical 
virtue that would indicate a similarity to sensory seemings, consilience.
Introduction
The nature and epistemological significance of intuitions is a question of importance given the frequency with which intuitions are invoked to support philosophical theories in areas such as ethics, aesthetics, 
epistemology, and metaphysics. In contemporary accounts of intuitions, two 
types of view predominate. One type of view attempts to account for intu-
itions as instances of some more familiar kind of mental content; intuitions as 
beliefs,1 or dispositions to believe.2  Another view is that intuitions are their 
own sui generis kind, distinct from these more familiar mental contents. An 
influential version of this latter is offered by George Bealer, according whom 
intuitions are “intellectual seemings”3 akin to sensory seemings. If such a view 
is right, then plausibly intuitions are a significant and basic source of evidence 
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about reality, in a way that sensory seemings are and in a way that beliefs are 
not. If Bealer’s view and those akin to it turn out to lack good arguments in 
their favor or turn out to be incorrect, the methodology frequently employed 
in the areas of philosophy noted above becomes more questionable. 
Bealer’s argument for intuitions as intellectual seemings is not consti-
tuted entirely by the phenomenological considerations I will discuss here, but 
it does draw on them in two ways. First, Bealer uses phenomenological con-
siderations to help establish what intuitions are not. He proceeds to the view 
that intuitions are not beliefs, judgments, guesses, or hunches, by highlight-
ing the incorrigibility, implasticity, and narrower scope of intutions. Second, 
Bealer uses phenomenological considerations to help positively establish that 
intuitions are seemings analogous to sensory seemings, arguing that intuitions 
display the same theoretical virtues as sensory seemings – consistency, cor-
roboration, and confirmation. In this paper my aim is to criticize these two 
moves. 
1. Distinguishing Intuitions from Beliefs, Judgments, Guesses, and 
Hunches
Bealer mentions several characteristic features of intuitions. Accord-
ing to Bealer intuitions are a sui generis “primitive propositional attitude.”4 
This attitude relates only to propositions that are both a priori and necessary.5 
Intuitions are evidentially basic,6 though not infallible.7 Intuitions are con-
scious episodes that appear phenomenologically as seemings.8 To ground the 
distinction between intuitions and beliefs Bealer raises two phenomenolog-
ical considerations, which I dub “the incorrigibility of intuitions” and “the 
implasticity of intuitions.” To ground the distinction between intuitions and 
judgments, guesses, and hunches, Bealer adverts to the narrower scope of the 
propositions that intuitions can be about.
1.1 The Incorrigibility of Intuitions
Bealer claims that intuitions and beliefs must be different because one 
can have a belief about some matter whilst having no intuition about it, and 
vice versa have an intuition about some matter whilst having no belief about 
it: “one can believe something and not intuit it, and one can intuit something 
and not believe it.”9 By itself, this claim by itself seems insufficient to distin-
guish beliefs and intuitions – if beliefs and intuitions are otherwise phenom-
enologically indistinguishable, I would be unable in any given case to say 
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whether I had a belief and lacked an intuition, or had an intuition and lacked 
a belief. But, as I read him, Bealer has more to say. Bealer notes that: 
“there are many mathematical theorems that I believe (because I have 
seen the proofs) but that do not seem to me to be true and that do 
not seem to be to be false; I do not have intuitions about them either 
way”10
And again that:
“I have an intuition—it still seems to me—that the naive truth sche-
ma holds; this is so despite the fact that I do not believe that it holds 
(because I know of the Liar paradox)”11
The idea here seems to be that beliefs are highly responsive to evi-
dence – in the first example a belief is called forth by seeing the proofs of 
the mathematical theorems and in the second example belief is absent be-
cause one knows of the Liar paradox. Beliefs do not persist in the face of 
superior countervailing evidence but rather are “automatically overridden…
displaced.”12 By contrast, in the examples given intuitions are not highly 
responsive to evidence – in the first example no intuition is called forth by 
seeing the proofs of the mathematical theorems and in the second example 
an intuition persists despite one’s knowing of the Liar paradox. Let’s call this 
responsiveness to evidence, especially as it concerns superior countervailing 
evidence, corrigibility, and its opposite incorrigibility. With this phenomeno-
logical difference we are provided with quite a handy method of determining 
whether a given propositional attitude is an intuition or a belief – we can 
expose ourselves to superior countervailing evidence about some proposition, 
and if a pro-attitude remains towards the proposition, then the attitude is 
plausibly an intuition and not a belief. My reading of Bealer’s argument here 
is that:
(1) Intuitions are incorrigible. 
(2) Beliefs are corrigible.
Therefore, (probably) intuitions are not beliefs. 
I offer two criticisms against this argument. First, regarding (1), it is 
not clear that most or all intuitions are incorrigible. Bealer offers a handful 
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of examples. Even if we were to multiply these examples, we could not be 
sure that (1) held quite generally. Whether intuitions are generally incorri-
gible or not is a question that can in principle be empirically investigated.  
However, as Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel remarked in 2014, thorough 
investigation of whether one’s “intuitions are wholly insulated from theoreti-
cal commitments”13 (one type of incorrigibility) has not yet been conducted. 
It seems that significant methodological difficulties would attend making 
investigations into the incorrigibility of intuitions. Since such investigations 
would concern how intuitions change (or do not) in response to superior 
countervailing evidence, it seems that a philosophically sophisticated subject 
pool would be required, as well as either accurate recollection and report of 
potentially long-lost intuitions, or a longitudinal study. 
To this criticism, a defender of Bealer might respond that such inves-
tigations are unnecessary, since it appears that there are at least some intu-
itions which are incorrigible, and that these form a set of counterexamples to 
taking intuitions as beliefs. To this I respond in turn that incorrigibility must 
be a widely-shared characteristic of intuitions if it is to ground a distinction 
between intuitions and beliefs. Without this being shown, alternative under-
standings of the situation remain plausible, e.g. perhaps incorrigibility is only 
a feature of some small subset of what we call intuitions—e.g. only mathe-
matical intuitions—other intuitions then being ripe for assimilation to the 
category of belief.
Importantly, against (1) there is significant anecdotal evidence count-
ing against the general incorrigibility of intuitions: reflecting on one’s own 
philosophical development or with that of philosophers with whose work 
one is intimately acquainted, one might identify many intuitions that proved 
corrigible, e.g. the thoroughgoing utilitarian who has not only abandoned the 
belief that “killing one to save five is wrong” but who also no longer has the 
corresponding intuition, a necessitarian who no longer has the intuition that 
various counterfactual states of affairs are even metaphysically possible, or a 
materialist who no longer has the intuition that philosophical zombies are 
possible. 
As a second criticism, regarding (2), Bealer’s case here depends on 
beliefs being generally corrigible. As a question of normative epistemology, I 
take it is a borderline platitude that when faced with superior countervailing 
evidence one ought to revise one’s beliefs, that one’s beliefs should be corri-
gible. But this is not our question. As a matter of “descriptive epistemology,” 
psychology, or of the phenomenology of belief, it is much less clear that in 
general people’s beliefs are corrigible. Indeed, we might note many cognitive 
biases which seem to involve incorrigible beliefs: various forms of prejudice, 
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positive or optimistic illusions,14 the positive beliefs of “recalcitrant smokers” 
about smoking,15 or the belief in a just world.16 Therefore, the possibility re-
mains that what we term intuitions are incorrigible beliefs. This is not to say 
that the person with incorrigible beliefs is (always) someone who irrationally 
refuses to even weigh countervailing evidence, but rather that they properly 
fulfill their epistemic duties yet find that their belief persists nevertheless. 
I also note that whilst conceptually it is incoherent to “believe x and 
know that x is false,” or even “believe x and not believe x,” it is not clear that 
these are descriptively impossible—we cannot infer from conceptual incoher-
ence to the actual impossibility of such phenomena, otherwise a phenomenon 
like cognitive dissonance could not occur. So, that we find cases in which 
someone takes both a pro and a con attitude towards some proposition does 
not imply that one of their attitudes must be a belief and the other something 
other than a belief (such as an intuition, a hope, an imagining, etc.) – rather 
both attitudes could be beliefs. 
1.2 The Implasticity of Intuitions
As another ground for the distinction between intuitions and be-
liefs, Bealer adverts to the implasticity of intuitions: “Belief is highly plastic. 
Using (false) appeals to authority, cajoling, intimidation, brainwashing, and 
so forth, you can get a person to believe almost anything, at least briefly. Not 
so for intuitions.”17 Bealer does not further characterize (im)plasticity, but 
the four examples he uses all seem to involve a belief being altered by means 
which are plainly non-evidential.
I take it then that implasticity concerns whether a propositional 
attitude can be induced or diminished by sundry non-evidential factors. My 
reading of Bealer’s argument here is that:
(3) Intuitions are implastic. 
(4) Beliefs are plastic.
Therefore, (probably) intuitions are not beliefs. 
My responses regarding the implasticity distinction parallel my re-
sponses to the incorrigibility distinction. Regarding (3), Bealer has not shown 
empirically that intuitions are implastic. Rather, there is some evidence that 
the opposite is true. Anecdotally, the familiar case of a professor having to 
coach students into “getting the right intuition,” say in relation to a Gettier 
example, seems to involve an appeal to authority and a little cajoling—which 
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suggests the plasticity of some intuitions. The findings of experimental phi-
losophy suggest that the prospects for Bealer’s contention being borne out 
are poor. To note two well-known cases, order of presentation effects18 and 
linguistic framing effects19 have been shown to influence intuition reports, 
suggesting a high degree of plasticity given how mild these methods are. 
Likewise, regarding (4), it seems that there are certainly some beliefs (that 
there are other minds, that such-and-such an action is immoral, etc.) which 
are highly implastic for most people regardless of appeals to authority, intim-
idation, and so forth. Given these garden-variety cases, the burden of proof 
is on Bealer to show any general difference of plasticity between belief and 
intuition. Though this criticism of Bealer is straightforward, Bealer repeats his 
claims about (im)plasticity on four occasions.20 
Bealer does admit that “there is disagreement about the degree of 
plasticity of intuitions” but claims that “it is clear that they are inherently 
far more resistant to such influences than beliefs”21 and again that “it is clear 
that, collectively, they [intuitions] are inherently more resistant to such influ-
ences than beliefs.”22 Bealer’s strategy here seems to be to weaken (3) and (4) 
in some way, to a claim along the lines that intuitions have a higher degree of 
implasticity than beliefs, or that intuitions are on average or typically more 
implastic than beliefs (it seems that Bealer could pursue a similar strategy in 
relation to incorrigibility) . The problem with this strategy is that it would de-
prive us of the tools to identify in any specific case whether a mental content 
was an more-than-usually plastic intuition or a more-than-usually implastic 
belief, causing problems for the use of intuitions in the justification of phil-
osophical theories. Without some further ground being adduced, we might 
suspect that there was just one type of attitude here that comes in degrees of 
plasticity (and likewise for incorrigibility). 
1.3 The Scope of Intuitions
In distinguishing intuitions from judgments, guesses, and hunches, 
Bealer appeals to a distinction of scope: “there are significant restrictions on 
the propositions concerning which one can have intuitions; by contrast, there 
are virtually no restrictions on the propositions which one can make a judg-
ment or a guess or have a hunch.”23 As noted previously, Bealer has in mind 
that intuitions can only be about matters which are a priori and necessary. My 
reading of Bealer’s argument here is that:
(5) Intuitions can only be about a priori and necessary propo-
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sitions.
(6) Judgments, guesses, and hunches, can be about virtually 
any propositions.
Therefore (probably) intuitions are not judgments, guesses, or 
hunches. 
Here, I grant both (5) and (6). I suggest, though, that this distinction 
of scope is not sufficient to rule out that intuitions are not simply a con-
ventionally defined subset of either judgments, or guesses, or hunches.  To 
illustrate, I might invent the term “hannch,” and claim that a hannch, though 
otherwise like a hunch, was very different from a hunch because a hannch 
only ever concerns a priori and necessary matters, whilst hunches might 
be about anything, e.g., “I have a hannch that the ontological argument is 
sound.” Although one is at liberty to invent such a category, it seems clear 
that hannches are always legitimately described as a subset of hunches rather 
than as a sui generis kind. So, this distinction of scope cannot by itself, with-
out some further phenomenological difference, show that intuitions are not 
just judgments, guesses, or hunches. 
Bealer cites one further difference, the choice-like nature of guesses: 
“Judgments are a kind of occurrent belief; as such they are not seem-
ings. Guesses are phenomenologically rather more like choices; they 
are plainly not seemings. And hunches are akin to merely caused, 
ungrounded convictions or noninferential beliefs; they too are not 
seemings.”24  
Bealer seems correct that guesses are phenomenologically more like choices, 
involving an element of volition that seems absent in both belief and intu-
ition. However, for Bealer judgments and hunches are beliefs. Therefore, it 
seems that to distinguish them from intuition on phenomenological grounds, 
Bealer would have to appeal to his incorrigibility and implasticity distinc-
tions, which if my previous criticisms were right, will be a move of no avail. 
Therefore, although Bealer successfully distinguishes intuitions from guesses 
on phenomenological grounds, it seems that intuitions might still be a type of 
belief, judgment, or hunch. 
2. The Theoretical Virtues of Intuitions and Sensory Seemings
Bealer argues that intuitions are analogous to sensory seemings in the 
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theoretical virtues that they enjoy, helping to establish that they are intellec-
tual seemings. An analogy to this effect would aid the case that intuitions are 
not beliefs, judgments, or hunches, and would also help establish the eviden-
tial value of intuitions. l note in passing my qualm that any analogy between 
intuitions and sensory seemings might be unduly attractive to us due to the 
deeply engrained metaphorical associations between thought and sight (“I see 
what you mean,” “Look at it from my perspective”). 
2.1 Consistency, Corroboration, and Confirmation
Bealer argues that intuitions and sensory seemings display the same 
theoretical virtues. Both display “consistency, corroboration, and confirma-
tion.”25 Regarding consistency, Bealer claims that intrapersonally “a person’s 
concrete-case intuitions are largely consistent with one another.”26 Regarding 
corroboration Bealer claims that there is an impressive agreement interper-
sonal agreement between people with regards to their “logical, mathematical, 
conceptual, and modal intuitions.”27 Regarding confirmation Bealer claims 
that “intuition is seldom, if ever, disconfirmed by our experiences and obser-
vations.”28 Sensory seemings display these same theoretical virtues, whereas 
beliefs do not. My reading of Bealer’s argument here is that:
(7) Intuitions display the theoretical virtues consistency, cor-
roboration, and confirmation. 
(8) Sensory seemings display the theoretical virtues consisten-
cy, corroboration, and confirmation.
(9) Beliefs, judgments, and hunches, do not display the theo-
retical virtues consistency, corroboration, and confirmation. 
Therefore, (probably) intuitions are intellectual seemings. 
I do not dispute (8) or (9). I have three criticisms to make of (7). 
First, it seems that Bealer could be too optimistic in his assessment of intu-
ition’s theoretical virtues. For one thing, as noted it seems that the experimen-
tal philosophy literature contains some cases of intrapersonal inconsistency in 
intuitions over time, and cases of interpersonal inconsistency in intuitions at 
a time.29 For another, it seems odd to claim that there is an intrapersonal con-
sistency in intuitions over time, since it seems that a large part of the influ-
ential “reflective equilibrium” method of philosophizing consists in trying to 
ascertain whether our intuitions really are consistent, finding that often they 
are not, and then abandoning some intuitions. For instance, we are almost 
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all initially responsive to deontological and utilitarian intuition pumps, but 
at some point some of us abandon, or stop “feeling the force of,” one or the 
other sorts of intuition—which implies that most people’s intuitions could 
not be described as consistent before they began philosophizing. At any rate, 
intuitions plausibly display these three theoretical virtues to a significantly 
lesser degree than sensory seemings do. 
Second, Bealer seems to employ very minimal conceptions of consis-
tency, corroboration, and confirmation. Consistency and corroboration are 
fulfilled merely so long as people’s intuitions do not contradict each other, 
whilst confirmation is characterized negatively; as intuition being “seldom, 
if ever, disconfirmed by our experiences and observations.” Each seems to be 
reduced to something like non-contradiction. Granting that intuitions do 
exhibit these minimal conceptions of these theoretical virtues, it is unclear 
that they exhibit more expansive conceptions of these theoretical virtues. One 
might say that corroboration and confirmation should involve novel predic-
tions by way of falsifiable hypotheses. But it is not clear that investigations 
into intuitions involve corroboration and confirmation in this more expansive 
sense. Nor does it seem that one can make a claim like “If philosophical theo-
ry x is correct, then we won’t encounter intuitions of sort y” without y quick-
ly being encountered for some significant proportion of subjects. By contrast, 
I take it that sensory seemings do exhibit these more expansive conceptions 
of these theoretical virtues. So, the similarity between sensory seemings and 
intuitions vis-à-vis these theoretical virtues is weakened when we see that it is 
equivocal between different conceptions of these theoretical virtues. 
A third criticism is to question whether intuitions can by themselves 
enjoy these theoretical virtues at all. Consistency, corroboration, and confir-
mation, we might say, are virtues that we attribute to theories, or to constel-
lations of theories and propositions, or to the relationships that propositions 
bear to one another in virtue of being mediated by some theory. For instance, 
let’s say that one has the intuition that “it is right for the bystander to push 
the fat man off the bridge to save five” and that one then has the intuition 
that “it is wrong for the doctor to take the organs of one patient to save five.” 
One might at first say that the second intuition is inconsistent with the first, 
or that it tends to falsify the first, or to disconfirm it. Rather, it seems that we 
can only say that the two intuitions have this effect on one another when we 
are reflecting on them in light of some familiar moral theory. For instance, if 
I am an act-utilitarian the second intuition might seem to tend to falsify and 
disconfirm both my act-utilitarian moral theory and my first intuition. But if 
I have some more exotic moral theory, the second intuition might be per-
fectly compatible with the first, or even help confirm it – e.g. I have a moral 
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theory that places great emphasis on role-based or associative duties I might 
take these two intuitions to be consistent and to corroborate and confirm one 
another. Therefore, I suggest then that Bealer is wrong to claim that there is 
an “on-balance agreement of elementary concrete-case intuitions”30, because 
such agreement only arises after intuitions have been brought under some 
theory, and other some other theory the very same intuitions might disagree. 
Without some theory that mediates them, we might say that two intuitions 
are the same proposition, or are different propositions, or are directly contra-
dictory propositions (“X” and “not-X”), but not much else. 
By contrast, I take it that sensory seemings (which it seems are not 
propositional attitudes at all) can be assessed as consistent, corroborating, or 
confirming before we have any explicit theories of, or beliefs about, how the 
world is. This is because we carry around with us sensory schemas and a naïve 
physics that develops in early childhood,31 that accompanies our sensory 
seemings—surprise or confusion arises when a sensory seeming is inconsis-
tent with them, falsifies, or disconfirms them (e.g. violations of object-perma-
nence achieved by sleight of hand, the sudden disappearance of a rabbit, the 
sudden appearance of a rabbit). 
2.2 Consilience
I suggest that the theoretical virtue that would both show intuitions 
to have a high evidential value and to be closely akin to sensory seemings is 
consilience, but that intuitions cannot display consilience. For my purposes I 
characterize consilience as being when a hypothesis is evidenced independent-
ly by several different types of evidential source. An indication of consilience’s 
importance is given by Laurence Bonjour’s case of the clairvoyant, in which 
the clairvoyant’s reliable ability to have true beliefs about the president’s 
whereabouts is so dubious because this reliable ability was not at all consilient 
with the clairvoyant’s other faculties, such as their sensory seemings.32 My 
argument here is that:
(10) Sensory seemings display consilience.
(11) Intuitions do not display consilience.
Therefore, probably intuitions are not intellectual seemings.
Regarding (10) I take it as highly plausible that consilience is ordi-
narily rampant amongst the various types of sensory seemings; a skunk gives 
rise to visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, thermoceptive and noci-
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ceptive seemings (depending on what we do to it).
By contrast, regarding (11), there is little consilience between intu-
itions and sensory seemings. Recall Bealer’s claim about the rarity of discon-
firmation of intuitions by sensory seemings. This might be explained by the 
remarkable consilience of the two. But more plausibly this is explained by the 
fact that intuitions (as characterized by Bealer) and sensory seemings concern 
disparate domains, on the one hand the a priori and the necessary, on the 
other a posteriori and the contingent. Since they are about disparate domains, 
there is little consilience between intuitions and sensory seemings. There 
would be evidential value to a high degree of consilience amongst intuitions, 
yet it seems that what would be more desirable is consilience about the same 
subject matter from different types of evidential source. For example, if I am 
blindfolded and I feel a spherical object with my hands, and come to believe 
“this object is spherical,” the best further evidence that I can obtain that con-
ciliates with my tactile seemings to support this belief is to remove the blind-
fold and get some visual seemings of the object. What is less desirable, but 
what it seems that intuition has to make do with, is akin to simply feeling the 
spherical object over and over, or feeling some cubes and some oblate spher-
oids to develop one’s tactile acuity, consiliating tactile seemings with yet more 
tactile seemings, without being able to call upon further types of evidential 
source. 
An advocate of Bealer’s views might suggest two ways in which at 
least some intuitions are in fact consilient, amongst themselves even if not 
with sensory seemings. 
First, they might say that a given philosophical claim can be evi-
denced by numerous consilient intuitions. For example, consider the innu-
merable Gettier cases. Perhaps these give rise to consilient intuitions each of 
which independently provides evidence for the claim that “knowledge is not 
true justified belief.” My response to this is that such Gettier cases are not 
consilient with one another, because they are in a sense all fundamentally the 
same case; whilst the details may vary, all elicit the very same intuition; “an 
instance of true justified belief that is not knowledge!” That this is so is shown 
by the thought that the repetition of cases is merely illustrative, rather than 
providing new evidence against the traditional analysis of knowledge. If this 
latter were true then one could build evidence against the traditional analysis 
of knowledge by hiring philosophers to devise Gettier cases ad infinitum. This 
response seems to be conceded by Bealer when he states that “use of such 
examples can be ‘modalized away’. That is, such examples can, at least in prin-
ciple, be dropped and in their place one can use a priori intuitions.”33 
Second, an ally of Bealer might claim that intuitions are consilient 
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when numerous different intuitions provide evidence for a particular phil-
osophical system. One might imagine a philosophical system-builder who 
invokes distinct intuitions at different points in his or her system-building 
—e.g. at one point to support libertarian free will, at another to support 
consequentialism—the result being a wide-ranging philosophical system. 
Here, I agree that the system exhibits the virtue of consilience – although no 
intuition is about the system itself, but rather each intuition is about some 
proposition within the system, the intuitions all evidence the system. But 
again, this consilience is a result of theorizing, prior to which the intuitions 
could not be described as consilient. By contrast, with sensory seemings the 
various types of seemings are consilient in that they evidence the very same 
object—the skunk is apprehended through vision, audition, etc. 
Conclusion
In sum, I have questioned both the negative and the positive aspects 
of Bealer’s phenomenological case for intuitions being intellectual seemings. 
Examining the incorrigibility, implasticity, and narrower scope of intuitions 
does not establish that intuitions are not just beliefs, judgments, or hunches. 
Likewise, intuitions and sensory seemings seem not to share the theoretical 
virtues that Bealer suggests that they do. I emphasize that there are aspects 
of Bealer’s account of intuitions that I have not addressed, and knock-on 
consequences of my argument that may impinge on Bealer’s wider dialectical 
purposes.34 Likewise I note that more recently other authors have noted or 
emphasized other phenomenological features of intuitions that supposedly 
distinguish them from other mental contents,35 so my arguments here are in 
no way intended as a complete discussion of the contemporary literature on 
the phenomenology of intuitions, but I take it that my arguments, if success-
ful, do tend to weaken the case for the sui generis view of intuitions. 
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